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Vanuatu and Cyclone Pam: 
An update on fi scal, economic, and development impacts
Introduction
During March 2015, Tropical Cyclone Pam charted a course of 
destruction through the southwest Pacifi c. The eff ects of the storm 
were felt in Kiribati, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. But the greatest 
impact was in Vanuatu, many of whose islands were battered by the 
Category 5 system. 
It is still too early to know the full economic, fi scal, and developmental 
impacts of Cyclone Pam on Vanuatu. As data come to hand, they 
will add to existing literature on the economic impacts of disasters. 
Cross-country econometric studies have produced mixed and often 
contradictory fi ndings when examining the impacts of disasters. 
This is not unexpected given that disasters come in many forms 
and aff ect both economic sectors (e.g., agriculture and services) 
and geographic areas diff erently. Cyclone Pam was unique given the 
breadth of its impact, but even in this case, some islands in Vanuatu 
such as Santo were not severely aff ected. 
In this article, we provide an update on estimated fi scal, economic, 
and development impacts of the cyclone on Vanuatu. We 
commence by establishing projections for the Vanuatu economy 
before the onset of the storm and move on to an examination of 
the immediate and short-term impacts. We then consider the 
medium- to longer-term impacts of this event, including risks and 
opportunities associated with reconstruction eff orts whether by 
government or development partners. We conclude with some 
recommendations for the future.
Background
The Vanuatu government’s budget policy statement for 2015, 
prepared prior to Cyclone Pam, predicted economic growth of 5.3% 
in 2015 and 2016, which was expected to level out at 3.6% in 2017 
(Government of Vanuatu 2015a). ADB forecasts for 2015 were 
lower, at 4% growth, given concerns about capacity constraints 
(ADB 2014).
Much of the anticipated growth was linked to the expected 
implementation of signifi cant infrastructure projects including the 
Port Vila Urban Development Project and the construction of a 
multipurpose terminal building at the Port Vila wharf. The two other 
signifi cant pillars of the Vanuatu economy continue to be agriculture 
and tourism.
Although more than 70% of Vanuatu’s population is engaged in 
agriculture, whether for subsistence purposes and/or to generate 
a cash income, there are relatively few formal jobs in this sector 
(approximately 5,000 for a population of around 270,000). 
Agriculture has long been neglected in Vanuatu in terms of 
government expenditure, and the 2015 budget intended to start 
addressing this by increasing the allocations to relevant agencies 
with particular focus on improving extension and outreach services.
The Reserve Bank of Vanuatu, in its quarterly economic review for 
the quarter ending December 2014, predicted growth of 2.4% in the 
agriculture sector for the period 2014 to 2016. Table 1 shows the 
change in value of four of the most signifi cant exports as compared 
with the fourth quarter of 2013. 
Table 1: Indicative agricultural exports for Q4 of 2014
Export commodity
Estimated value 
of exports in Q4 
of 2014 ($)
% change over Q4 
of 2013
Copra 839,415 –81.6
Coconut oil 3,574,839  77.4
Kava 2,339,688   5.1
Beef 1,085,758  14.7
Source: Reserve Bank of Vanuatu.
Tourism is the most signifi cant economic sector in terms of job 
creation, with the majority of those opportunities located in 
Port Vila. The importance of tourism has risen in the last decade. 
Tourism expenditure as a percentage of GDP has increased from 
26% in 2002 to 33% in 2010. Tourism has also driven growth in 
the infrastructure and agriculture sectors, leading the World Travel 
and Tourism Council to estimate that tourism contributes 64.8% 
to Vanuatu’s GDP, both directly and indirectly (World Travel and 
Tourism Council 2014). 
However, there are signs that tourism growth has slowed in recent 
years. Total visitor arrivals declined in 2014 as compared with 2013 
(Table 2). In the fi rst 2 months of 2015, accommodation providers 
in Port Vila reported that forward bookings for the middle of the 
year (traditionally a peak period) were the lowest they had been for 
a number of years.
Table 2: Comparison of visitor arrivals to Vanuatu, 
2013–2014
2013 2014 % change
Air arrivals 110,045 108,656 –1.3
Cruise ship arrivals 233,097 220,205 –5.5
Total arrivals 343,142 328,861 –4.2
Source: Vanuatu National Statistics Office.
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Immediate and short-term impacts
Tropical Cyclone Pam is the largest cyclone ever to have hit 
Vanuatu and is one of the most severe storms experienced in 
the Pacifi c. It directly aff ected 22 of the 63 inhabited islands, 
destroying and damaging housing, crops, businesses, and critical 
public infrastructure including schools, medical facilities, roads, and 
bridges. The offi  cial death toll of 11 is astonishingly low given the 
strength of the cyclone and its widespread impact. This is a credit 
to both the disaster preparedness of the Vanuatu government and 
the resilience of Ni-Vanuatu, who have long been accustomed to 
cyclonic activity.
The most immediate need in the aftermath of Cyclone Pam was 
for a humanitarian response to address needs for water, shelter, 
and food. The government of Vanuatu and the UN Offi  ce for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Aff airs launched a fl ash appeal to 
raise funds to provide humanitarian assistance for a 3-month period 
until the end of June. Subsequently, a humanitarian action plan to 
run until the end of July was prepared and the combined requested 
funding is $38 million.
Given the importance of subsistence agriculture to the population of 
Vanuatu, food security has been a matter of great importance in the 
immediate and short term. The government has led the distribution 
of food aid, largely in the form of rice, tinned fi sh, noodles, and 
high-energy biscuits, with the assistance of humanitarian partners 
including the World Food Program. With each issue of food aid, rural 
communities have received seeds, seedlings, and gardening tools 
so that food gardens could be reestablished as soon as possible. 
On 1 June the government launched the Urban Gardens project to 
promote the use of state land and undeveloped leased land as food 
gardens for a 12-month period in recognition of the need to address 
urban food security issues (Newton Cain 2015).
It became very clear very quickly that the logistical implications 
and associated costs associated with meeting the humanitarian 
needs are many and varied. In the very early stages of the response, 
these diffi  culties were exacerbated by a lack of communications, 
particularly with rural and remote areas. There was no shortage 
of off ers of help from near and far, from governments, NGOs, 
the private sector, and others. From the start, the government of 
Vanuatu made it clear that it intended to lead the response (and 
subsequent activities related to recovery), and this caused some 
tension between the government and NGOs. A number of senior 
offi  cials were seconded to work within and with the National Disaster 
Management Offi  ce on aid distribution, placing additional strain on 
a small bureaucracy with limited across-the-board capacity.
In the immediate aftermath and as a way of promoting early recovery 
eff orts, the government made a number of decisions with fi scal and 
economic implications. 
They were:
(i) waiver of VAT and duty on imported seeds, gardening tools, 
and building materials;
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(ii) release of $9,124 to each of the country’s 52 members of 
Parliament (i.e., a doubling of the constituency allowance for 
2015); and
(iii) direction to the Vanuatu National Provident Fund (the 
national pension fund) to facilitate members to withdraw 
20% of their retirement accounts to fund rebuilding and/or 
livelihood restoration.
These measures supported households in the aftermath of the 
cyclone. However, they also adversely aff ected the fi scal position 
of the government, which is under considerable pressure (and is 
likely to remain so for some time) given the expected downturn 
in two of the most signifi cant sectors, agriculture and tourism, as a 
consequence of the cyclone. During the recent extraordinary sitting 
of Parliament, a supplementary budget of $437,956 was approved.
Government estimates of economic growth in Vanuatu have 
been modifi ed considerably to take into account the eff ects of 
Cyclone Pam. Figure 1 shows economic growth estimates both prior 
to and after the passage of Cyclone Pam. In its postdisaster needs 
assessment, the Government of Vanuatu estimates that Cyclone 
Pam had a substantial negative impact on GDP, but the impact 
will be mitigated to some extent by economic activity associated 
with recovery and reconstruction. Growth in 2015 is now projected 
at 1.4% (Government of Vanuatu 2015b). This is 3.2% lower than 
expectations prior to Cyclone Pam, but higher than initial forecasts 
in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone (a preliminary assessment 
by ADB projected a contraction of –0.5%, and the recent IMF 
Article IV Consultation projects growth of –2.0%).
Figure 1: Impact of Cyclone Pam on projected GDP growth 
in Vanuatu
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Economic activity is expected to rebound in 2016 due to 
reconstruction and recovery activity, as well as the commencement 
of a number of large infrastructure projects conceived prior to 
Cyclone Pam. The government’s postdisaster needs assessment 
predicts GDP growth of 10.3% in 2016. It should be noted that 
this estimate is aff ected by the availability of fi nance and capacity 
constraints and is therefore subject to a high degree of uncertainty. 
ADB estimates made in the initial aftermath of Cyclone Pam 
predicted signifi cantly lower growth of 4%. The recent IMF Article IV 
Consultation projects growth of 5% in 2016.
Future growth rates will depend on how quickly tourism recovers. 
This sector is of particular concern, given its overwhelming 
importance to the economy as a whole. While cruise ship calls 
resumed in a short space of time, a number of properties in and 
around Port Vila had to close for repairs and both Air Vanuatu and 
Virgin Australia reduced their fl ight schedules, refl ecting a drop 
in demand. Many properties have now reopened, but two of the 
biggest will be closed until the end of 2015. 
Experience in other countries suggests that there is reputational 
damage associated with large-scale disasters such as Cyclone Pam, 
and that it can take years for the tourism sector to fully recover 
from such events. This stresses the importance of a new campaign 
promoting Vanuatu as a holiday destination in the largest source 
markets (Australia, New Zealand, and New Caledonia). Vanuatu’s 
most signifi cant competitor in the tourism market, Fiji, is likely to 
benefi t from the expected downturn in Vanuatu in the meantime 
(Figure 2 shows the substitution eff ect between these two 
destinations).
Medium- to longer-term outlook
As Vanuatu moves from the humanitarian response stage to 
recovery and reconstruction, the enormity of the task has become 
apparent. Again, experience from elsewhere may give some 
indication about how this event could aff ect economic activity and 
growth in Vanuatu. Loayza et al. (2009) determined that a “typical” 
(median) disaster has a negative impact on medium-term future 
economic growth, although the eff ects vary according to the type 
of disaster experienced and the sector under consideration. In some 
cases, disasters are found to have positive economic impacts, such 
as where the industrial sector increases output further after fl oods, 
earthquakes, and storms (including cyclones)—no doubt as a result 
of subsequent reconstruction activities. However, this should not be 
equated with economic welfare or well-being. 
In Vanuatu, household spending on rebuilding and rehabilitation 
is already making it diffi  cult for families to maintain or increase 
investment in nonrecovery activities such as education (Dornan and 
Newton Cain 2015a). The economic literature suggests that severe 
disasters such as Cyclone Pam have eff ects that are considerably 
more pronounced than ‘median’ disasters. In these cases, there is a 
clear negative impact on future GDP and future output in agricultural, 
industrial, and service sectors. The extent of these impacts depends 
on a range of factors. Cavallo and Noy (2010) found after reviewing 
the literature that the medium- to longer-term economic impacts 
are aff ected by a country’s “ability to mobilize signifi cant funding for 
reconstruction.” They argue that, as a result, poor countries suff er 
more in the medium and longer term owing to disasters.
The Vanuatu government’s postdisaster needs assessment, 
prepared with support from development partners, notes that the 
economic value of the impacts of Cyclone Pam amounts to $449.4 
million (Government of Vanuatu 2015b). This equates to 64.1% 
of GDP (based on the 2013 fi gures). By comparison, the costs of 
reconstruction in Samoa after Cyclone Evan in 2012 equated to 
30% of GDP. The assessment report cautions that the estimates 
of damage and loss are likely to be underestimates as a result of 
limitations to the data that were available at the time. Table  3 
provides more detail as to damage and loss in selected sectors 
of the Vanuatu economy, as reported in the postdisaster needs 
assessment.
In terms of estimated recovery costs, the postdisaster needs 
assessment is equally sobering. The total estimated cost of recovery 
over a 4-year period is $328.2 million (43.3% of GDP), with 52% of 
this relating to the public sector.
These costs are far beyond the government’s ability to meet 
from domestic revenue even without the extra pressures on the 
current account referred to earlier. The need for external funding 
is undeniable. The previous Council of Ministers was considering 
a 2-year reconstruction and recovery plan that will set out the 
priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation of public assets 
such as schools and health facilities. We have yet to see how this 
will progress given the change of government on 12 June. There has 
already been recognition that there will need to be prioritization 
of which assets are to be replaced and/or repaired. Managing 
community and political expectations is likely to prove tricky, not 
least because the country will go to general elections in 2016. 
Figure 2: Comparison of visitor arrivals to Fiji and Vanuatu
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There are a number of ways that this work will be fi nanced. While 
a surge in aid will cover some of the reconstruction costs, previous 
experience from around the world indicates that it will fall well short 
of what is required (Becerra, Cavallo, and Noy 2012). Closer to 
home, past disasters in Vanuatu (three cyclones during 1985) and 
Samoa (Cyclone Evan in 2012) generated an increase in aid that 
amounted to around 5% of GDP, well short of what was required 
(Dornan and Newton Cain 2015a).
Development partners, in providing support, should be striving to 
harmonize their processes and absorb more of the transaction costs 
involved in getting projects approved. The Vanuatu government 
has become increasingly vocal about the need for donors to use 
government systems since Cyclone Pam. With an infl ow of large sums 
of aid, there is a real risk that parallel systems will be created, and that 
the best and brightest Ni-Vanuatu will seek employment with donor 
agencies and/or NGOs at the expense of government institutions.
Use of government systems is low in Vanuatu, partly due to donor 
perceptions of poor governance, and partly due to limited capacity 
in line areas of government that could otherwise implement donor-
funded projects. In 2010, less than 30% of aid provided to Vanuatu 
was directed through government mechanisms (Vanuatu Peer 
Review Team 2010). It is in this context that the previous prime 
minister has specifi cally requested budget support, and has asked 
that development partners make greater use of government systems 
and processes. 
The Vanuatu government will also need to borrow funds for 
reconstruction, as did the Government of Samoa after Cyclone Evan. 
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Access to fi nance for reconstruction is an essential element of 
recovery, and one that infl uences the severity of the economic 
impacts of a disaster (Cavallo and Noy 2010). Vanuatu is currently in a 
sound fi scal position, with public debt equivalent to only 21% of GDP, 
well below the 40% threshold recommended by the International 
Monetary Fund. On the face of it, the Vanuatu government is in 
a position to borrow money for reconstruction. However, closer 
inspection reveals a somewhat diff erent story. It currently has a 
signifi cant pipeline of infrastructure investments forecast, which is to 
be funded through a combination of grants and concessional loans 
from donors. These projects would result in a considerable increase 
in public debt (Figure 3).
It would be preferable to cancel or postpone some of these projects 
in order to provide greater fl exibility for borrowing to fi nance 
reconstruction. However, the political realities are likely to make that 
very diffi  cult (Dornan and Newton Cain 2015a). Debt management 
is therefore going to be a crucial element in Vanuatu’s longer-
term recovery, with careful attention required to what projects are 
approved and on what terms. This will also need to be an important 
concern among development partners.
Conclusions and recommendations
Vanuatu faces signifi cant challenges as it seeks to rebuild and 
recover from Cyclone Pam. The recovery of the tourism sector will 
be a crucial determinant of Vanuatu’s medium-term economic 
prospects. A proactive strategy to rebuild the sector is needed, 
including promotional activities that have in the past received 
limited government attention and funding. As part of “building back 
Table 3: Estimates of economic value of impact on selected sectors of the Vanuatu economy
Disaster eff ects ($ million) Share of disaster eff ects (%)
Damage Losses Total Private Public
Productive sectors 78.9 96.3 175.2 98.0 2.0
Agriculture 13.2 43.0 56.1 93.0 7.0
Commerce and industry 11.1 19.9 31.0 100.0 0.0
Tourism 54.7 33.4 88.1 100.0 0.0
Social sectors 132.7 5.8 138.6 67.0 33.0
Housing (private) 87.5 40.7 128.2 100.0 0.0
Education 36.2 0.7 36.9 0.0 100.0
Infrastructure sectors 59.3 27.1 86.3 51.0 49.0
Transport 27.9 19.8 47.7 43.0 57.0
Communication 20.9 3.6 24.5 67.0 33.0
TOTAL 270.9 178.5 449.4 69.0 31.0
Notes: Damage (or direct impacts) refers to the economic and financial impacts resulting from damaged infrastructure and physical assets. Losses (or indirect 
impacts) refers to economic and financial impacts resulting from changes in economic activities, such as reduced tourism numbers or higher prices for certain 
inputs to production. Exchange rate used is $1 = 108.04 vatu.
Source: Government of Vanuatu. 2015c. Budget Policy Statement 2016. Port Vila.
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better,” eff orts will need to extend beyond Port Vila to ensure that all 
communities aff ected by the cyclone benefi t (Dornan and Newton 
Cain 2015b). The reconstruction of infrastructure linking these 
communities to Port Vila should be a priority for the same reason. 
Access to fi nance and the way in which capacity constraints 
are managed will also be important. Both have the potential 
to undermine reconstruction and recovery activities—a point 
emphasized in the economic literature on disasters. Damage from 
Cyclone Pam, estimated at the equivalent of 64.1% of GDP, means 
that very signifi cant funding is required for reconstruction. The 
government will be expected to fi nance over half of this amount, 
both for repair of government infrastructure and services and in 
support of private sector recovery eff orts. 
Development partners can be expected to, and are already, assisting 
with this eff ort. However, development assistance is unlikely to fund 
more than a modest proportion of the total expenditure required. 
This highlights the importance of ensuring that assistance is well 
targeted, with partners coordinating their assistance and working 
closely with the Vanuatu government—measures also important for 
management of capacity constraints. 
The Government of Vanuatu will also need to borrow to fund the 
reconstruction and recovery eff ort. It is currently in a position to 
do so; however, a pipeline of new infrastructure partially funded 
through concessional loans means that care will need to be taken 
to avoid excessive borrowing. The terms of new debt will need to be 
scrutinized closely to ensure that the quality of future loans is given 
due consideration. Prioritization of infrastructure projects will also 
be required. There is no doubt that this will be politically challenging. 
The resilience shown by Ni-Vanuatu in recent months, together 
with a commendable response by the Vanuatu government, should 
nevertheless be cause for optimism.
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Figure 3: Vanuatu government debt
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